The Lives of Others: Social Rationality in Animals by Stevens, Jeffrey R. & King, Andrew J.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Jeffrey Stevens Papers & Publications Psychology, Department of
2013
The Lives of Others: Social Rationality in Animals
Jeffrey R. Stevens
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jstevens5@unl.edu
Andrew J. King
The Royal Veterinary College, University of London, ajking@rvc.ac.uk
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychstevens
Part of the Animal Sciences Commons, Animal Studies Commons, Applied Behavior Analysis
Commons, Behavior and Ethology Commons, Biological Psychology Commons, Cognition and
Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Communication Commons, Evolution
Commons, Other Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Commons, and the Other Psychology
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey Stevens Papers & Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Stevens, Jeffrey R. and King, Andrew J., "The Lives of Others: Social Rationality in Animals" (2013). Jeffrey Stevens Papers &
Publications. 5.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychstevens/5
409
Published in Simple Heuristics in a Social World, ed. Ralph Hertwig,  
Ulrich Hoffrage, and the ABC Research Group. Oxford University Press, 
2013, pp 409–431. Copyright © 2013 Ralph Hertwig & Ulrich Hoffrage. 
Used by permission.  
The Lives of Others: Social Rationality 
in Animals 
Jeffrey R. Stevens and Andrew J. King 
... there is no fundamental difference between man and  
the higher mammals in their mental faculties. 
Charles Darwin (1871) 
Amanda sits waiting in a nail salon. She is on a day out with her two 
neighbors Bridget and Camille, who are already being served by dif-
ferent attendants. After observing Bridget’s body jolt several times, 
Amanda makes her way over to Camille’s attendant for her own ser-
vice. By using a simple social cue, Amanda has probably saved herself 
a good bit of pain and may even have established a lifelong relation-
ship with the apparently more skilled attendant. 
If you replace “nail salon” with “cleaning station,” these circum-
stances apply perfectly well to an instance of social rationality in fish! 
Cleaner fish (e.g., the cleaner wrasse, Labroides dimidiatus) establish 
cleaning stations to feed on parasites attached to the skin of various 
species of client fish. Sometimes, however, instead of taking the para-
sites, the cleaner fish bite a piece of skin or mucus-both of which they 
prefer to parasites. When this happens, the client fish jolt. These jolts, 
paired with the client fish’s chasing the nippy cleaners, provide social 
cues about the cooperativeness of the cleaners, and client fish use this 
information when deciding which cleaner to visit (Bshary, 2002). At-
tending to the behavior, choices, and decision outcomes of others can 
be beneficial, and this socially savvy behavior is by no means restricted 
to nail salons and cleaning stations, or even to any particular species 
or class of animals. Instead, we shall argue that social rationality is a 
key aspect of the lives of animals. 
In the quote introducing this chapter, Darwin (1871) boldly claimed 
that humans and other animals differ very little in their cognition; a 
statement that has raised the ire of many scientists (Bolhuis & Wynne, 
2009; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008). Rather than  stating this 
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continuity as a fact, we will explore the similarities and differences 
between humans and animals in the social rationality of their decision 
making. We find this a fruitful exercise because it can profit research-
ers of both humans and animals. 
Our purpose here is to provide an evolutionary background of so-
cial rationality: Why do animals attend to the lives of others? To this 
end, we begin by introducing the importance of social situations for 
the evolution of behavior. We then take a more process-based approach 
to social decision making by reviewing, first, the use of simple deci-
sion mechanisms such as heuristics or “rules of thumb” by animals; 
second, the requisite capacities and abilities needed for socially ratio-
nal behavior; and, third, the influence of the environment (social and 
otherwise) on these decision mechanisms. Each of these topics could 
yield a chapter (or book) of its own, so instead of a thorough over-
view, we provide a brief introduction of animal social rationality and 
a few key examples of the roles of heuristics, cognitive capacities, and 
the environment. 
Evolution and Social Rationality 
We begin our journey into the evolution of social rationality with Her-
bert Simon’s (1990a) metaphor for boundedly rational decision mak-
ing: “Human rational behavior (and the rational behavior of all phys-
ical symbol systems) is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the 
structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of 
the actor” (p. 7). Although he focused on human behavior, does Simon’s 
scissor metaphor apply equally well to animals? We think so, but the 
need for this metaphor differs when studying animal behavior. Simon 
proposed the scissors metaphor because psychologists tend to focus 
on the mechanisms of the human mind, often neglecting the environ-
ment. For students of animal behavior, the bias tends to be reversed: 
Influences of the environment are exceptionally well studied, but ac-
tual cognitive mechanisms of behavior receive less attention. 
The environment is a critical feature of studying animal behavior 
because of its importance in natural selection. For a brief recap, there 
are three requirements for natural selection to operate: variation in 
characteristics (e.g., beak shape in birds); inheritance of character-
istics (e.g., parents pass on genes for beak shape to young); and dif-
ferential survival and reproduction, or Darwin’s (1859) “struggle for 
existence” (e.g., only individuals with certain beak shapes can open 
available seeds). This struggle for existence occurs in relation to both 
the physical and social environment. Because “natural selection acts 
by competition” (Darwin, 1859, p. 472) for food, shelter, mates, and 
space, the social environment plays a particularly crucial role for the 
evolution of behavior.  
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Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) illustrates the im-
portance of the social environment for animal decision making. This 
framework provides a tool to explore the strategic component of an-
imal behavior. That is, animals do not choose where to forage, with 
whom to mate, how to raise offspring, and when to cooperate, in a so-
cial vacuum. Rather, the consequences of making these decisions de-
pend upon what others in the population do. Evolutionary game theory 
is similar to standard economic game theory (von Neumann & Mor-
genstern, 1944), except that it focuses on the population level rather 
than the individual level. Economic game theory assumes that ratio-
nal agents choose the “best strategy” by computing the appropriate 
payoffs, given perfect knowledge of the partner’s beliefs and behavior. 
Evolutionary game theory, in contrast, assumes minimal abilities of 
the agents, embeds them in a population of agents employing different 
strategies, and lets natural selection choose the best strategy or strat-
egies. In other words, animals implement different possible strategies, 
but the selection of these strategies takes place through an evolution-
ary process (Conradt & List, 2009; Stevens, 2008). Evolutionary game 
theory has enjoyed great success in explaining animal behavior (Du-
gatkin & Reeve, 1998), perhaps more success than classical economic 
game theory enjoys for human behavior (Camerer, 2003). 
The Social Brain 
Despite its success, evolutionary game theory has been limited by its 
emphasis on behavior and its neglect of the cognitive building blocks 
required to implement the evolved strategies that may be used in these 
games. This is a critical void because species vary widely in the cog-
nitive abilities used to solve similar tasks. Take navigation as an ex-
ample. Ants track scents laid on the ground by other colony members, 
birds orient with magnetic fields in the earth, and humans follow elab-
orate maps. These mechanisms, more often than not, efficiently guide 
the ant, bird, or human to their intended location, yet each requires 
a very different set of cognitive tools. What can explain these differ-
ences in cognition? What selective forces could generate complex and 
varied cognitive abilities? 
Early work on the evolution of animal cognition and intelligence 
highlighted the role of ecology-an animal’s habitat, food, and preda-
tors- as a driving force shaping cognition. In particular, food distri-
bution, food extraction, and ranging patterns are correlated with var-
ious measurements of brain size in primates (Milton, 1981; Parker 
& Gibson, 1977). For instance, howler monkeys (Alouatta palliata) 
eat primarily leaves, whereas spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) con-
sume more fruit. This difference in diet leads to different cognitive 
demands for foraging. Leaves are abundant, but fruit, in contrast, is 
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more patchily distributed. Milton suggested that the spatial and tem-
poral variation associated with foraging for fruit may have selected 
for more sophisticated cognition to track the variable environment. 
In fact, for howler and spider monkeys, as well as primates and other 
mammals more generally, fruit-eating species have larger brains on av-
erage than leaf-eating species. The correlation between foraging ecol-
ogy and brain size, however, disappears for primates when you factor 
in body size (Dunbar, 1992), and some argue that a more potent force 
exists: social relationships. 
The social brain hypothesis assumes that the complexities of social 
life require sophisticated mental abilities (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dun-
bar, 1998; Humphrey, 1976; see also chapter 1). A special kind of in-
telligence is required for the ever-changing social demands of main-
taining group cohesion, coordinating movement, preserving bonds, 
forging alliances, tracking cooperation, detecting cheaters, commu-
nicating information, manipulating competitors, and in general stra-
tegically responding to and interacting with other responding and in-
teracting agents. 
Given the demands of social life, the social brain hypothesis predicts 
that individuals of highly social species will evolve intelligent ways to 
cope with this complexity. Intelligence is, of course, difficult to define 
and even trickier to measure and compare across animal species. Al-
though researchers can successfully relate social life to measures of 
intelligence such as incidence of behavioral innovation, social learn-
ing, and tool use (Reader & Laland, 2002), more typically they use the 
proxies of group size and brain size. For instance, when showing that 
ecological factors accounted for little variation in primate brain size, 
Dunbar (1992) contrasted this finding with a strong correlation be-
tween group size and brain size. Specifically, the mean group size cor-
related with the size of the neocortex relative to the rest of the brain 
for primates (Figure1). Dunbar (1998) argued that this relationship did 
not result from visual, memory, or emotional demands. Rather, rela-
tive neocortex size increased with group size because the capacity to 
gather, update, and manipulate information about social relationships 
should directly correlate with the number of relationships individuals 
must track. This is particularly relevant for species with fission-fusion 
social dynamics in which individuals are constantly joining and leav-
ing the group. Such flux may require that individuals constantly track 
and maintain information on the presence and absence of others and 
respond appropriately (Aureli et al., 2008). 
The social brain hypothesis and fission-fusion dynamics do not ap-
ply only to nonhuman primates. Dunbar (1992) used the correlation 
between group size and relative neocortex size observed for nonhu-
man primates to predict a social group size for humans. Using a re-
gression equation on data for 38 primate genera, Dunbar predicted a 
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mean group size of 148. Dunbar also found empirical support for this 
prediction: The average number of people living in 21 surveyed hunter-
gatherer societies around the world was 148.4 (Dunbar, 1992). Along 
similar lines, non-primate species that show rather enhanced and flex-
ible forms of cognition (e.g., corvids, parrots, elephants, dolphins and 
whales) are highly social and many exhibit fission-fusion dynamics 
(Aureli et al., 2008; de Waal & Tyack, 2003). Consequently, several in-
dependent cases of group size/brain size correlations provide conver-
gent evidence for the social brain hypothesis. 
Games Against Nature 
The social brain hypothesis typically implies that strategic games 
against other individuals drive cognition. Yet, often animals are locked 
in a constant game against nature to find food, shelter, and a safe place 
to raise their young. Although, at first glance, the struggle against na-
ture appears to lack a social component, even in these situations, ani-
mal decisions depend critically on the actions of others. Here, we focus 
on two ways in which animals interact with others to solve problems in 
Figure 1. Evidence for the social brain hypothesis. This figure shows the log-
log relationship between neocortex ratio (neocortex size relative to the rest 
of the brain) and mean group size (r2 = 0.80 with humans included, upper 
right diamond). This pattern also holds when apes and monkeys are analyzed 
separately. (Source: Redrawn, with human data added, from Journal of Human 
Evolution, 22, R. I. M. Dunbar, “Neocortex size as a constraint on group size 
in primates,” pp. 469-493, copyright 1992, with permission from Elsevier.)  
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their physical environment. First, they may treat other individuals as 
sources of information to make individual decisions. Second, they may 
band together to make collective decisions in the struggle against their 
physical environment. In both cases, the addition of a social component 
provides an opportunity to greatly foster individual decision making. 
Using Social Information •  When individuals face uncertainty in their 
environment, the behavior and actions of other individuals with sim-
ilar requirements become especially useful. Specifically, individu-
als who can monitor and use the information that other individuals 
provide- known as “social” or “public” information (Dall, Giraldeau, 
Olsson, McNamara, & Stephens, 2005)-are in a position to improve 
both their decision-making speed and its accuracy (Franks, Dornhaus, 
Fitzsimmons, & Stevens, 2003; King & Cowlishaw, 2007). The use of 
social information can therefore be thought of as a force that promotes 
the evolution of social living. 
Consider a simple example borrowed from Sumpter (2010). When 
searching for food, one bird observes another bird with its head down, 
pecking in the ground. From this observation alone, the observer ob-
viously does not know whether this other bird has discovered food or 
is simply searching for food. However, we know from laboratory stud-
ies that when ground-feeding birds (spice finches, Lonchura punctu-
lata) have their heads down, they have likely found something to eat 
(Coolen, Giraldeau, & Lavoie, 2001). The proportion of time a bird 
has its head down indicates the bird’s foraging success. Thus, a bird 
that follows a simple heuristic “always join a bird with its head down; 
never join a bird with its head up” will, on average, do better than if it 
joined another bird at random. Empirical evidence suggests that this 
is exactly what happens. Using an artificial flock of model birds, some 
with heads down and others with heads up, Drent and Swierstra (1977) 
showed that barnacle geese (Branta leucopsis) were more likely to land 
near groups of models where more birds had their heads down: akin 
to “copying successful individuals” (Allison, 1992; chapter 12). 
Despite the adaptive appearance of learning from others, an evolu-
tionary analysis predicts that the advantages of using individual or so-
cial learning depend on the level and timing of variability in the envi-
ronment and the error rates and costs of both types of learning (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985). Empirical evidence supports this notion. Individ-
uals switch conditionally between reliance on information they collect 
themselves (individual learning) and information provided by others 
(social learning), according to their respective reliability and cost (van 
Bergen, Coolen, & Laland, 2004; chapter 14). 
A number of other factors can also promote or constrain the use 
of social information. One such factor is the structure of the social 
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network; that is, the pattern of relationships across members of a 
group. The spread of information may depend differentially on larg-
escale network structure such as permanent groups versus ephemeral 
fission-fusion groupings, or at a finer scale, it can also depend on the 
social relationships between group members. Social network analysis 
(Krause, Croft, & James, 2007) can help clarify to what degree this is 
the case (Figure2). For instance, individuals with many social contacts 
might be most influential in information transfer (Lusseau & Newman, 
2004). The pattern of contact could also influence information trans-
fer (see chapter 7). 
Group Decision Making • In addition to parasitizing information from 
others, animals may pool information and preferences to make deci-
sions in a group. Of interest are situations in which a collective of in-
dividuals aims to “outwit nature”: How can a collective of individu-
als increase their chances of finding the correct answer to a problem 
Figure 2. Network structures in fish. Croft et al. (2006) recorded associations 
between wild guppies (Poecilia reticulata) to conduct a social network analy-
sis. Statistics that identify clustering of individuals identified five communi-
ties within the pools, represented by filled squares, filled inverted triangles, 
filled triangles, empty diamonds and empty circles. (Source: Reprinted with 
kind permission from Springer Science + Business Media: Behavioral Ecology 
and Sociobiology, “Social network theory in the behavioural sciences: poten-
tial applications,” 62, 2007, 15-27, J. Krause, D. P. Croft, & R. James, Figure 3.) 
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posed by their environment? Research tackling this question in the so-
cial science literature is vast (for examples, see chapters 10 and 11). In 
contrast, researchers in the natural sciences have only recently consid-
ered such questions in detail (for a review, see Conradt & Roper, 2005). 
First, groups can improve the accuracy of their decisions by aggre-
gating information across individuals, a principle first highlighted 
by Francis Galton in 1907. When attending a country fair, Galton ob-
served that one of the attractions was to guess the weight of an ox 
once slaughtered and dressed. Galton took the answers of the nearly 
800 fair-goers and computed the average, which turned out to fall 
within one pound of the right answer (Surowiecki, 2004), even though 
a random individual taken from within this collective is likely to be 
very far from the true answer. This principle has been applied to an-
imal decision making, in which error is assumed to be unbiased. For 
example, for migrating birds that must navigate to a specific loca-
tion, the average direction of all group members is more likely to be 
correct than following the direction of anyone randomly chosen indi-
vidual (Figure3; Simons, 2004), and this has been supported by ex-
periments with pairs of migrating birds (Biro, Sumpter, Meade, & 
Guilford, 2006). Second, group members can follow the actions of an 
especially informed leader who can guide groups of naïve individu-
als to resources they would otherwise not be able to locate (Couzin, 
Krause, Franks, & Levin, 2005; King, Johnson, & Vugt, 2009). In both 
scenarios, individuals may be able to tap into this social information 
by using simple heuristics, or “rules of thumb.”  
Figure 3. The advantageous effect of large group size on navigational accu-
racy for a theoretical migrating bird flock. The triangles depict 95% confi-
dence intervals of trajectories for simulations of a single bird and flocks of 
10, 100, and 1000 individuals of equal navigational ability. (Source: Redrawn 
from Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 19, A. M. Simons, “Many wrongs: the 
advantage of group navigation,” pp. 453-455, copyright 2004, with permis-
sion from Elsevier.)  
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Animal Heuristics or “Rules of Thumb” 
The social environment clearly imposes strong selective pressures on 
animals, but does social complexity necessitate cognitive complexity? 
Barrett, Henzi, and Rendall (2007) argue no: Simple minds can deal 
with social complexity. Rather than maintaining representations of 
their complex social (and physical) environments, animals may use 
“rules of thumb” or simple heuristics to negotiate the complexity (see 
also chapter 1). This view advocates situating animals in their envi-
ronments to assess how they might exploit the structure of the envi-
ronment, closely mirroring the approach taken by the fast and fru-
gal heuristics program (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 
1999; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011), with its focus on ecolog-
ical rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). 
Some of the most fascinating examples of social behavior in animals 
involve remarkable temporal synchrony: Large groups of fireflies fill 
the trees in Malaysia and all flash their lights in unison, synchronized 
within 30 milliseconds of each other (Buck & Buck, 1968). Such a high 
degree of synchrony does not necessitate complex cognition, however; 
simple heuristics suffice. The fireflies simply reset their pacemaker 
when they see another flash, resulting in a remarkably coordinated 
outcome. Although the role of heuristics is not universally accepted by 
researchers of human decision making (see, e.g., the commentaries on 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000), evolutionary biologists describing animal 
decision making have relied on them for decades. 
Hutchinson and Gigerenzer (2005) reviewed some of the heuristics 
that animals use when foraging, searching for mates, finding and con-
structing nests, and tracking moving objects. When we say that animals 
“use a heuristic,” we mean that they exhibit a behavior consistent with 
the use of a heuristic. For instance, when dragonflies pursue and in-
tercept moving prey, they seem to use a simple heuristic: Steer to keep 
the prey in a constant retinal position (Olberg, Worthington, & Vena-
tor, 2000). Rather than calculate where the prey will be, the dragon-
flies simply maintain the prey in a fixed point in their visual field (Fig-
ure 4). Interestingly, baseball players use a similar heuristic to catch fly 
balls-they keep the angle of gaze to the ball constant (McBeath, Shaf-
fer, & Kaiser, 1995). This gaze heuristic (Gigerenzer, 2007) seems to be 
useful for a variety of organisms to intercept a moving object. 
Simple Heuristics 
Humans and animals use similar heuristics in nonsocial domains. Do 
humans also share heuristics with other species in social domains? 
Next, we briefly describe a few examples of simple heuristics used by 
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animals in social domains, ranging from mating choices to coopera-
tive behaviors to collective decision making. 
Choosing a mate is an important social decision for most animals 
(chapter 16). Mates provide “good genes” for offspring, as well as po-
tential help in raising young. How should one go about choosing a 
mate? One strategy might involve assessing information about a po-
tential mate’s health, fitness, and care-giving abilities, then carefully 
weighing each of the attributes to generate a “value” for each mate and 
choosing the mate with the highest value. A simpler strategy is to copy 
the mate choices of others. When you see another individual choose a 
potential mate, then just copy this choice. This occurs in female gup-
pies (Poecilia reticulata): females are more likely to choose males that 
they observe near other females (Dugatkin, 1996). In fact, social cues 
are so strong that they can override previous choices. If females choose 
male A over male B in an initial choice, they often switch to male B 
in a second choice, following the observation of another female near 
male B. Although this may sound rather capricious of these guppies, 
very similar strategies may be used in humans. When rating the at-
tractiveness of or interest in members of the opposite sex, both men 
and women rate potential partners as more desirable when those part-
ners are paired with other partners (Place, Todd, Penke, & Asendorpf, 
2010; Waynforth, 2007). Consequently, copying the choices of others 
can be a quick, simple way for humans and animals to select mates. 
Simple heuristics also apply in cooperative situations (chapter 5). 
Kin-directed altruism, for instance, implies that individuals can dis-
criminate kin to direct their help appropriately (e.g., help siblings 
more than cousins). Animals adeptly discriminate kin and use various 
Figure 4. The gaze heuristic in dragonfly foraging. When intercepting flying 
prey, dragonflies seem to maintain a constant angle of attack. (Source: Re-
drawn with kind permission from Springer Science + Business Media: Journal 
of Comparative Physiology A: Neuroethnology, Sensory, Neural, and Behavioral 
Physiology, “Prey pursuit and interception in dragonflies,” 186, 2000, pp. 155-
162, R. M. Olberg, A. H. Worthington, & K. R. Venator, Figure 3.)
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mechanisms for doing so (Fletcher & Michener, 1987). Common mech-
anisms used by animals are simple heuristics such as “be nice to indi-
viduals near your home” or “help those that you grew up with.” Rather 
than try to directly assess kinship (a nearly impossible task for many 
species), these heuristics use cues such as spatial proximity or dura-
tion of association, which are often highly correlated with relatedness. 
They are by no means perfectly correlated, as illustrated by the perva-
siveness of brood parasitism (e.g., when cuckoos lay their eggs in other 
birds’ nests, the hatchlings are often treated as offspring and siblings). 
Nevertheless, animals use these proxies for kinship to direct help. For 
instance, Holmes and Sherman (1982) reported an elegant cross-fos-
tering experiment in which newborn ground squirrels (Spermophilus 
parryi and S. beldingi) were placed in different nests to be raised by 
non-genetically related parents. Supporting the familiarity rule, ag-
gression between individuals depended on whether they were raised 
together rather than on genetic relatedness. A similar pattern of kin 
discrimination appears in humans in the form of incest taboos. When 
children in Israeli communes (or kibbutzim) were raised in small, age-
matched cohorts of both sexes, members of these groups rarely mar-
ried each other (Shepher, 1971). This has been suggested as a mecha-
nism to avoid the genetic costs of incest, a potentially strong selective 
pressure for detecting kin (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). 
Another simple heuristic used in cooperative situations is tit-for-
tat, a heuristic that generates reciprocal altruism (Axelrod & Hamil-
ton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). If interaction partners take turns cooperating, 
the cooperative action is effectively an investment in the future recip-
rocated benefits. Tit-for-tat simply starts by cooperating with a part-
ner, then copies the partner’s cooperation or defection in the previous 
move. Tit-for-tat is a quite simple strategy, and evolutionary simula-
tions suggest that it can outperform pure defection if a pair of individ-
uals interacts often enough (although it is not an evolutionary stable 
strategy; see Selten & Hammerstein, 1984). Tit-for-tat-like behavior 
seems to be fairly widespread in human cooperative interactions (Os-
trom & Walker, 2003); however, its existence is less well supported in 
animals. Despite its seeming simplicity, the cognitive building blocks 
required to implement it are not trivial (see below, next section, on 
cognitive building blocks). Thus, here we have a case in which humans 
seem to use this simple heuristic, but animals may not. 
The heuristics we have described so far operate among relatively 
few individuals, but heuristics can also play an important role in col-
lective animal behavior that can involve hundreds or thousands of in-
dividuals. For instance, how do collections of individuals decide when 
to move towards a specific resource (e.g., foraging site or waterhole) 
or switch behaviors (e.g., from resting to foraging) as a group? One 
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way of achieving this is for individuals to respond only when they see 
a threshold number of individuals (a quorum) or a majority of con-
specifics performing a particular behavior or heading in a specific di-
rection, even if they themselves are not motivated to do so. This way, 
individuals have a mechanism for maintaining group cohesion and 
achieving group decisions. Indeed, such responses are common in an-
imal groups across a variety of taxa, from ants, to fish, to primates 
(Sumpter, 2010), and copying successful individuals, copying success-
ful behaviors, and copying the majority are all heuristics that usefully 
apply to human social settings (Mesoudi, 2008). Collective problems, 
and group movement in particular, offer a number of instances in 
which animal use simple heuristics in social domains. 
Take a situation we humans encounter regularly as social animals. 
When walking down a busy street in rush hour, you balance your de-
sire to reach your destination with your local environment-the motion 
and positions of other nearby pedestrians. You may not be able to see 
much more than a couple of people ahead of you, and the movements 
of you and your neighbors may appear disorganized. However, if you 
look down upon the crowd, you would see some very obvious patterns 
of behavior. For instance, the crowd may have assorted themselves 
into a series of lanes, each composed of people moving in the same 
direction (Couzin & Krause, 2003; Helbing & Molnar, 1995; Moussaïd, 
Helbing, & Theraulaz, 2011). This allows the pedestrians to move to-
ward their destination quickly and often more accurately. The mech-
anism for such lane-formation is surprisingly simple. Given a suffi-
ciently high traffic flow, individuals balance their desire to move in an 
intended direction with a desire not to collide with other people. In-
dividuals will, by chance, fall in behind another individual moving in 
the same direction, resulting in a “stable” state. Individuals may also 
actively seek out others moving in the same direction, facilitating this 
process (Couzin & Krause, 2003). 
Such “self-organization,” where a global pattern emerges as a con-
sequence of interactions among individuals responding to local infor-
mation, is surprisingly common in human and animal aggregations 
alike (Camazine et al., 2001; Sumpter, 2006). The evolutionary func-
tion of and proximate mechanisms influencing these swirling, pulsing 
masses of individuals are only now beginning to be fully understood. 
It is possible that the huge variety of shapes and motions of animal 
groups that we see in animal aggregations results from only small 
variations in heuristics followed by individual group members. For 
instance, Couzin, Krause, James, Ruxton, and Franks (2002) proposed 
a model in which individual animals follow three simple heuristics: 
“move away from very nearby neighbors,” “adopt the same direction as 
those that are close by,” and “avoid becoming isolated” (Figure 5, Panel 
A). Their model showed that three very different collective patterns of 
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behavior could emerge as a consequence of only small adjustments to 
just one of these three rules: the radius over which individuals adopt 
the same direction with one another (Figure 5, Panels B-D). 
Do models like those of Couzin et al. (2002) correspond to what 
we see in nature? Are these simple rules responsible for reproducing 
Figure 5. Couzin et al.’s (2002) model of collective behavior. Panel A: An illus-
tration of the rules governing an individual in the model shows the individ-
ual centered at the origin: zor is the zone of repulsion; zoo is the zone of ori-
entation; zoa is the zone of attraction. Panel B: Couzin’s models showed that 
if individual agents had attraction to group-mates, but low, or no, zone of ori-
entation (zoo), they formed a “swarm.” In this swarm state, even though indi-
viduals tended to rotate around the group center, they did so in different ori-
entations. Panel C: As the size of the zoo was increased, however, the group 
formed a “torus” in which the individuals perpetually rotated around an empty 
core, and the direction of rotation was random. Panel D: If zoo was increased 
further, the group initially adopted a “dynamic parallel” conformation in which 
the agents’ movements were strongly aligned in a single direction. (Source: 
Redrawn from Journal of Theoretical Biology, 218, I. D. Couzin, J. Krause, R. 
James, G. D. Ruxton, & N. R. Franks, “Collective memory and spatial sorting 
in animal groups,” pp. 1-11, copyright 2002, with permission from Elsevier.)   
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these complex collective behaviors? In fact, very few model valida-
tions exist. One recent attempt to test the validity of such models was 
undertaken by Ballerini et al. (2008). They measured three-dimen-
sional positions of individual starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) in flocks 
containing thousands of individuals, and their analyses suggest that 
many of these zone-based models accurately reflect empirical obser-
vations. For instance, they showed that individual birds had a well-
defined repulsion zone (Figure 5, Panel A), which was equal in diam-
eter to the average wing span of the birds. This zone was extremely 
stable across flocks. However, they also found that, although birds 
accounted for their physical distance to their neighbors, for more 
distant birds, the actual distances did not matter. Instead, individual 
birds interacted with (i.e., responded to behaviors from) up to its sev-
enth neighbor, wherever its location in space. Studies like Ballerini 
et al. are rare, and although theoretical models continue to be devel-
oped, empirical tests lag behind. Careful empirical work is needed 
because similar patterns of behavior can result from very different 
underlying heuristics. For example, the coordinated mass migration 
in juvenile desert locusts (Schistocerca gregoria) can look very sim-
ilar to patterns of flocking in birds or schooling fish, but these in-
sects do not rely on zone-based heuristics. Instead, the coordinated 
mass migration is influenced strongly by cannibalistic interactions: 
Abdominal biting and the sight of others approaching from behind 
triggers movement, creating an autocatalytic feedback that results 
in directed mass migration (Bazazi et al., 2008). It is therefore im-
portant that these theoretical models continue to be tested across 
different animal taxa—including humans (Dyer, Johansson, Helbing, 
Couzin, & Krause, 2009)—to validate their basic assumptions con-
cerning the likely heuristics being employed. 
Cognitive Building Blocks for Simple Heuristics in a Social World 
So far, we have referred to some of the simple heuristics in a rather 
vague manner. For heuristics to be useful in the study of cognition, 
however, they must be specified precisely so that they can actually 
model the process of decision making (Gigerenzer, 1996a). To fully 
specify a model of a cognitive process, one must carefully consider 
the building blocks of evolved capacities required to implement the 
process. Different capacities are needed for different heuristics, and 
even other heuristics may act as building blocks (Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2007). The gaze heuristic that we described earlier, for instance, re-
quires the capacity to track moving objects. Although this may seem 
easy to us and trivial from a process perspective, it is no small feat 
for a computer program to track moving objects. Thus, considering 
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the cognitive building blocks required for heuristics can illuminate 
our understanding of the processes involved in decision making. It 
can also allow us to make predictions about the evolutionary feasi-
bility of heuristics. 
If specific building blocks are required for a particular heuristic, 
then we can screen either individuals or species for this requisite 
building block and make predictions about the ability to implement a 
particular heuristic. Cross-sectional or longitudinal studies across the 
lifespan could provide key data to explore these ideas. For instance, 
children younger than four years old seem to have a less than fully de-
veloped capacity to make inferences about the beliefs of others (Well-
man & Brandone, 2009). This would suggest that strategies requiring 
inferring the beliefs of others would not be feasible for young children 
or populations with a deficit in this capacity (such as autistic individ-
uals). Mind reading is a requisite building block for economic game 
theory because full rationality necessitates that “I know that you know 
that I know that you know,” ad infinitum (McCabe, Smith, & LePore, 
2000). In fact, children improve in their strategic reasoning in games 
as they get older (Perner, 1979; chapter 6), mirroring the development 
of their understanding of mental states in others. Comparing species 
can also allow us to explore how building blocks are assembled to gen-
erate heuristics. For instance, animals vary in their ability to wait for 
delayed rewards (Stevens & Stephens, 2009), so we would predict that 
only species demonstrating patience could implement strategic deci-
sions depending on future payoffs, like reciprocity. 
It is important to trace heuristics back to their building blocks be-
cause it can give us leverage on what kinds of strategies might actu-
ally evolve (Stevens, 2008). Currently, evolutionary models that test 
the evolutionary stability of heuristics neglect the cognitive building 
blocks required to implement these strategies. Without an understand-
ing of the cognition needed to use these strategies, these models lack a 
realistic background with which to test the evolution of behavior. We 
illustrate this contention with an analysis of the building blocks re-
quired for the well studied heuristic tit-for-tat. 
The Building Blocks of Tit-far-Tat 
Tit-for-tat is a simple heuristic that achieves cooperation by copying 
a partner’s action in the last interaction. Despite its apparent sim-
plicity, when we explore the cognitive building blocks required to im-
plement tit-for-tat, we see that it is not as simple as it looks. If other 
animals lack the requisite building blocks, this may explain why tit-
for-tat-like strategies are rare outside humans (Hammerstein, 2003; 
Stevens & Hauser, 2004).  
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Trivers’s (1971) original formulation of reciprocal altruism pro-
posed three requirements for its evolution: First, the reciprocated 
benefit must outweigh the immediate cost; second, individuals must 
interact repeatedly; and third, individuals must recognize each other. 
These requirements, however, most likely underestimate the cogni-
tive tools necessary for both developing and maintaining a system 
of stable reciprocity. In particular, if a time delay exists between the 
cost of a cooperative act and the benefit of reciprocated cooperation, 
this introduces a number of cognitive challenges. These challenges 
may apply to many implementations of reciprocal altruism—here we 
focus on the cognitive building blocks (evolved capacities) required 
to implement tit-far-tat. 
Individual Recognition ● Like kin-directed altruism, tit-far-tat requires 
targeting specific other individuals for cooperation. Therefore, the de-
layed, contingent response required for tit-far-tat necessitates that in-
dividuals can distinguish different partners. Mechanisms for individ-
ual recognition appear to be quite common in animals from wasps to 
sheep, and they can use visual, acoustic, and olfactory cues (Tibbetts 
& Dale, 2007). Consequently, in explaining the paucity of evidence for 
tit-far-tat in animals, one cannot appeal to individual recognition as 
a constraint. 
Number, Amount, and Time ● Numerical abilities can play a key role 
in tit-far-tat when individuals must precisely quantify the reward 
amounts being reciprocated. If a cooperative act is fixed and discrete 
(e.g., giving an alarm call), quantification skills will be unnecessary. 
But if variation exists in the amount of benefit in question, then quan-
tification becomes quite important. Accurate quantification in ani-
mals is limited to small magnitudes; at larger magnitudes, quantifi-
cation abilities resort to a more approximate system (Figure 6, Panel 
A; Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 
2004). Thus, when engaging in tit-for-tat, most animals either will be 
limited to small numbers of objects in cases where the exchange must 
be precise (a banana for a banana), or they will be freed from this con-
straint where approximate exchanges are tolerated. The same predic-
tion holds for cases in which the currency is time, such as the duration 
of a grooming bout. If one monkey grooms another for 10 minutes, the 
groomer will most likely accept as fair exchange a reciprocated groom-
ing bout of between 8-12 minutes. As reward quantity and time mag-
nitudes increase, quantification accuracy decreases, making equitable 
exchange of cooperation more difficult and leaving opportunities for 
cheaters to exploit the judgment errors.  
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Figure 6. Number, patience, and memory in pigeons (Columba livia). Experi-
mental psychologists have tested pigeons in a number of tasks that tap possi-
ble cognitive building blocks required for tit-for-tat. Panel A: In a task in which 
pigeons are reinforced for choosing the larger of two sets of dots, the ratio be-
tween the number of dots (large/small) influences performance. As pigeons 
make discriminations between larger numbers of dots (i.e., the magnitudes of 
both large and small sets increase), the numerical ratio decreases, and the pi-
geons drop to chance performance (Source: Redrawn from “Birds’ judgments 
of number and quantity” [Figure 15] by J. Emmerton, in R. G. Cook [ed.], Avian 
visual cognition, copyright 2001, with permission.) Panel B: In self-control 
tasks, pigeons must choose between waiting a short time for a small amount 
of food and waiting a longer time for a larger amount of food. When plotting 
the present value of a delayed reward, the pigeons show a steep drop in value 
over very short time delays. A reward loses about half of its value when de-
layed 3-5 seconds. (Source: Redrawn from part of Figure 3 [p. 46], Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 81, L. Green, J. Myerson, D. D. Holt, J. R. 
Slevin, & S. J. Estle, “Discounting of delayed food rewards in pigeons and rats: 
is there a magnitude effect?” pp. 39-50, copyright 2004, with permission from 
the Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.) Panel C: Pigeon mem-
ory is tested with a delayed matching-to-sample task in which the subject is 
shown a stimulus and after some delay must match that stimulus. Longer re-
tention times (time between removing the stimulus and presenting choices) 
degrade their ability to correctly match the stimulus. Increasing the exposure 
time to the stimulus aids performance, as illustrated by separate lines on the 
graph. (Source: Redrawn from Learning and Motivation, 7, D. S. Grant, “Effect 
of sample presentation time on long-delay matching in the pigeon,” pp. 580–
590, copyright 1976, with permission from Elsevier.)  
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Patience ● Reciprocal altruism is also a problem of patience: Can an 
individual inhibit the choice of an immediate, small reward of defec-
tion to gain the long-term, larger benefits from cooperation? Indeed, 
a number of researchers have predicted that lack of patience prevents 
the establishment of cooperation (Green, Price, & Hamburger, 1995; 
Rachlin, 2000). Experimental data on variation in human patience and 
cooperation validate the view that a preference for immediate rewards 
may inhibit reciprocity. Patience correlates with cooperation in hu-
mans such that individuals who can wait for delayed gains also cooper-
ate more frequently (Harris & Madden, 2002). In parallel, captive blue 
jays (Cyanocitta cristata)—a small, North American corvid-showed sta-
ble cooperation against reciprocators in an altruistic cooperation game 
only following an experimental manipulation that increased their pa-
tience (Stephens, McLinn, & Stevens, 2002). This connection between 
patience and cooperation is particularly problematic given the rela-
tively impulsive preferences shown by animals (Figure6 Panel B; Ste-
vens & Stephens, 2009). Implementing tit-far-tat requires overcom-
ing a very strong drive for immediate payoffs. 
Memory ● Because tit-far-tat requires tracking a partner’s last inter-
action, two types of memory can implement this requirement (see 
also chapter 7). The simplest requires a single memory “slot” for a 
partner that can be replaced with “cooperated” or “defected.” This 
is effectively the memory system assumed in models of cooperation 
(e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The other memory system that could 
implement tit-for-tat is episodic memory-the ability to recall specific 
episodes from the past (Tulving, 2002). In this case, episodic mem-
ory recalls an event (“what”) performed by an agent (“who”) at a 
particular time (“when”). Thus, for tit-far-tat, episodic memory can 
be used to recall whether a partner cooperated or defected in the last 
interaction. Although animals seem to exhibit episodic-like memory 
(Clayton, Russell, & Dickinson, 2009), it is not clear how long these 
memories are retained. Because memory degrades fairly rapidly over 
time, previous interactions can interfere with recalling the most re-
cent at long intervals between interactions (Figure6 Panel C). More-
over, real agents do not just interact with a single partner, but are 
embedded in a large social network of partners. Tracking reciprocal 
obligations with the extensive social network found in many species 
may place a computationally intensive burden on memory systems. 
Although few studies examine learning and memory constraints in 
cooperation (but see Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Winkler, Jonas, & 
Rudolph, 2008), studies of human memory suggest that these con-
straints may pose challenges for tit-far-tat. In particular, people have 
a difficult time accurately tracking past cooperation, and this error 
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increases when one has more partners to track (Stevens, Volstorf, 
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2011). Despite the apparent simplicity of the 
memory system required for tit-for-tat, in actuality, robust memory 
can highly constrain its implementation. 
By exploring the cognitive building blocks, we discover, surprisingly, 
that the simple-looking heuristic of tit-for-tat may not be as simple 
to implement as it appears. This cautionary tale highlights the impor-
tance of carefully considering the cognitive machinery required for 
various decision strategies, especially in evolutionary models. 
The Role of the Environment 
Thus far, we have considered how social pressures influence decisions. 
This is very much in line with the idea of ecological rationality, where 
decision rules are adapted to the structure of the physical and social 
environment. Ecological rationality in humans, however, often does not 
refer to adaptation over an evolutionary time frame but rather to re-
sponding to changes in their current physical and social environment 
in real time. Real-time, adaptive decision making is not unique to hu-
mans, however; a number of animal examples exist. 
To understand the conditions necessary for real-time adaptive deci-
sions to evolve, we must consider the relative costs and benefits for al-
ternative strategies. This “payoff structure” is especially critical from 
an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. Animals are, in fact, quite 
sensitive to payoff structures. In laboratory experiments, blue jays 
played experimental games with other individuals, and, depending on 
their choices and the choices of their partners, they received different 
amounts of food (Stevens & Stephens, 2004). Varying the payoffs in 
these cooperative games tested how the jays responded to the reward 
contingencies in the environment. Their responses were clearly con-
text-dependent and adaptive: The jays cooperated in mutualism situ-
ations, defected in an altruistic cooperation game, and cooperated in 
a game in which each player had to rely on its partner to receive any 
food (Stevens & Stephens, 2004). 
The jays learned the environmental contingencies of the social 
games and responded appropriately. Does this response, however, 
carryover into more naturalistic situations? Work on primates has 
explored the importance of the physical distribution of food in their 
environment on cooperation. Specifically, researchers have tested to 
what extent primates respond to the divisibility of food resources. Di-
visibility of food is important because highly divisible food can be dif-
ficult to monopolize by a single individual, hence food sharing may 
be more likely. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show clear sensitivity 
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to food divisibility in a number of ways, including by increasing re-
cruitment calls, levels of harassment, and cooperative problem solv-
ing when food is divisible compared to monopolizable (Hauser, Teixi-
dor, Fields, & Flaherty, 1993; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006; Stevens, 
2004). Thus, animals carefully monitor their physical environment 
when making social decisions. 
As we have seen, the social environment may provide crucial pres-
sures in shaping individual decision strategies, and this fact becomes 
particularly relevant when considering decision making under uncer-
tainty; that is, in situations in which animals must choose between 
options that vary in their probability of receipt. Sensitivity to uncer-
tainty has a long history in the study of animal behavior (Kacelnik & 
Bateson, 1996), and food caching provides a useful example of how so-
cial competition generates uncertainty. 
The harsh conditions of winter can wreak havoc on the foraging 
strategies of many creatures. The freezing temperatures, blustery 
winds, and blanketing snowfalls make foraging very difficult, espe-
cially when food is scarce. Many animals have solved this problem by 
caching-an individual collects and hides food, and then returns to it at 
a later time (Smith & Reichman, 1984). Caching offers an extraordi-
nary case of patience in animals, because the cachers may not return 
for months to retrieve the food. They forgo immediate consumption 
to save food for a time in which it will be even more valuable. This is 
a risky strategy, however, because caches can be pilfered if others ob-
serve an individual either storing or retrieving a food item. Therefore, 
social competitors can provide an even greater source of uncertainty 
than the physical environment. 
Scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica), social birds of the corvid fam-
ily, engage in complicated food-caching in an uncertain environment, 
employing different caching strategies depending on the social situa-
tion (Clayton, Dally, & Emery, 2007; Clayton & Emery, 2009). A novel 
experimental setup developed by Emery and Clayton (2001) tested to 
what extent scrub jays protected their cache. Laboratory jays were 
allowed to cache either in private (when another bird’s view was ob-
scured) or while another bird was watching, and then they could re-
cover their caches in private. Emery and Clayton’s results demon-
strated that the jays remembered the social context of specific past 
events, and adjusted future behavior accordingly by re-caching food 
that another individual had observed (Figure7). Other experiments 
showed that the scrub jays also remembered which individual watched 
them during particular caching events and as a consequence altered 
their re-caching behavior accordingly, by increasing re-caching when 
dominants were observing (Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2006). Such ex-
periments demonstrate that animals carefully attend to and respond 
to their social environment by attributing knowledge to conspecifics, 
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and using this information in their own decision making, all the while 
considering the actions and behaviors of others. How do these find-
ings fit into our comparison between humans and animals in the so-
cial rationality of their decision making? 
Such socio-cognitive abilities are often thought to be uniquely hu-
man, because, as we have seen argued throughout his book, humans 
must deal with high cognitive demands in their social worlds. Never-
theless, this socio-cognitive model applies to corvids, and evidence 
from other taxa that differ vastly in terms of their shared evolution-
ary history (e.g., nonhuman primates: Byrne & Corp, 2004; cetaceans: 
Marino, 2002) suggests that these abilities must have arisen indepen-
dently multiple times. For instance, a common ancestor to mammals 
and birds lived over 280 million years ago, and the two taxa have very 
different brains (Emery & Clayton, 2004). Thus, although species may 
differ vastly in their morphology and physiology, where environmen-
tal pressures demanded sociality and competition for resources de-
manded alliances, cooperation, and deception, selection favored “so-
cially intelligent” animals, human and otherwise. 
Conclusion 
The social milieu plays a critical role in the evolution of decision 
making. It requires strategically responding to others and affords the 
Figure 7. Attention to the social environment in scrub jays. When observed 
caching by other individuals, scrub jays are much more likely to re-cache the 
food than when they cache in private. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. (Source: Adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 
from Nature, 414, N. J. Emery, & N. S. Clayton, “Effects of experience and so-
cial context on prospective caching strategies by scrub jays,” pp. 443-446, 
copyright 2001.) 
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opportunity to use social information and make collective decisions. 
These features make the social environment a strong selective force 
shaping decision making and cognition (see also chapter 1). In the cur-
rent chapter, we have emphasized three key components of social ra-
tionality in animals. First, we agree with Barrett et al. (2007) that a 
complicated social environment does not necessarily require sophisti-
cated cognition. Instead, simple heuristics can be quite useful for or-
ganisms and can result in rather complex social behaviors. From mat-
ing, to cooperation, to self-organized group decision making, simple 
heuristics are a common means of navigating the social terrain. Many 
heuristics are used by both humans and other animals (e.g., mate copy-
ing, gaze heuristic), whereas others may not be used very frequently 
by other animals (e.g., tit-far-tat). Second, in part to explain this vari-
ation in the use of different heuristics, we must clearly delineate the 
cognitive building blocks required for heuristics. This will help nar-
row down the space of possible heuristics to an implementable set and 
provide predictions about what species or individuals should be able 
to use particular heuristics. We saw, for instance, that some relatively 
simple-sounding heuristics such as tit-for-tat actually require more 
sophisticated building blocks than may be assumed at first glance, in-
cluding precise quantification, patience, and accurate memory. The 
lack of one or more of these building blocks in animal species may ex-
plain the relative dearth of evidence for tit-for-tat in nonhumans. Fi-
nally, the role of the physical and social environment is critical for 
social rationality in animals. We focused on how social interactions in-
fluence behavior usually considered “individual decision making,” such 
as decision making under uncertainty. The social world of an organ-
ism, composed of conspecifics and other species, is a constant source 
of uncertainty. Therefore, including the social environment is crucial 
when exploring the ecological rationality of simple heuristics. 
The examples given here, as well as those in Hutchinson and Giger-
enzer (2005), demonstrate that the application of bounded, ecologi-
cal, and social rationality apply across the animal kingdom, including, 
of course, humans. This should give some leverage to the study of hu-
man decision making, because the animal literature can provide fresh 
ideas for heuristics and other decision processes that may be relevant 
to human decision making (e.g., Hutchinson, Wilke, & Todd, 2008; 
Wilke, Hutchinson, Todd, & Czienskowski, 2009). The animal litera-
ture is particularly useful for testing questions of ecological rational-
ity because species have evolved in different environments, which may 
shape their decision processes differently. Thus, one can compare de-
cisions across species with predictions based on their ecology (Heil-
bronner, Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2008; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, 
& Hauser, 2007; Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005). 
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The connection between evolution and cognition is a two-way street, 
however. Not only can psychologists profit from an evolutionary per-
spective, but biologists should include cognition in their models of be-
havior. Evolutionary models that plug in appropriate cognitive build-
ing blocks for different species can investigate what types of strategies 
could have evolved, given the constraints of the cognitive system. This 
combination of the evolutionary and cognitive aspects of decision mak-
ing, we believe, addresses the spirit of Simon’s scissors by joining the 
study of the social and physical environment and the mind.   
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